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1. On April 7 1932, Walter Benjamin boarded the steam freighter Catania 
in Hamburg, en route to Barcelona. From Barcelona, Benjamin made his 
way to the Island of Ibiza, where his friends the Noeggeraths were waiting 
for him. In 1932, lbiza appeared to Benjamin archaic and pristine: 
The most remote of places [ ... ] cut off from the world and 
civilization [ ... ] (die Insel wirklich seitab des 
Weltverkehrs und auch der Zivilisation). Just as farming 
and animal husbandry are still carried on here in an archaic 
manner (Wie Ackerbau und Viehzucht hier noch archaisch 
betrieben werden)- there are not more than four cows on 
the whole island, as the peasants keep to their tradition of 
goats, no agricultural machinery to be seen and the 
irrigation of the fields is done as it was centuries ago with 
water scooped up by wheels turned by mules (die 
Bewasserung der Felder wie vor Jahrhunderten durch 
Schopfrader geschieht) - so the interiors are also archaic: 
three chairs against the wall opposite the entrance confront 
the visitor with aplomb and gravity, as if there were three 
Cranachs or Gauguins on the wall; a sombrero hung on the 
back of a chair creates more effect than precious Gobelin 
tapestries. (Benjamin, letter to Gerhard Scholem, 22 April 
1932. Briefe, Band 2, 1966: 548, English translation by 
Anthony Stephens.).1 
1 Benjamin, Walter, Bnefe, Band 2, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966), p 548. English 
translation by Anthony Stephens. 
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In the tranquillity of the house that he rented for "one mark and eighty", 
Benjamin found the space and serenity to start sketching one of his most 
illuminating reflections on time: Berliner Chronik (A Berlin Chronicle). 
The late 1920s and early 1930s had proven quite taxing and traumatic 
for Benjamin. He had recently divorced from his wife Dora and, as a result, 
he had virtually lost all of his material property, including most of his 
beloved library. He moved from rented flat to rented flat and his famous 
love for travelling, which continued incessantly even in these troublesome 
years, increasingly became a form of escapism. In travelling, Benjamin was 
not only finding refuge from a personal life in disarray but also from a 
highly volatile and menacing political situation. It is rather fitting and quite 
just - in a life otherwise characterised by gross miscalculations and bad 
luck - that the money Benjamin needed to travel to Ibiza came to him 
thanks to Goethe's anniversary celebrations and the work Benjamin 
produced in honour of the occasion. In effect, Benjamin's life as a 
wandering and exiled intellectual began to take shape and form in those 
early years of the 1930s. Far from coincidentally, Benjamin felt the need to 
pause during this unsettled period and to write once again about his 
childhood and Berlin. He conceived of this work not only as a gift to his 
son Stephan but also as a kind of intellectual and spiritual will. 
2. Benjamin's recollection of his childhood in Berlin for his son Stefan is 
interspersed with many qualifications and clarifications. The narrative is so 
often interrupted by haphazard and strategically inconsistent explanations 
(one, for instance, would assume that methodological claims should be 
made at the beginning of a text), that there is no way of knowing whether 
such provisos are for the benefit of Stefan or Benjamin himself, or whether 
they are in fact not explanatory at all but rather integral parts of the 
narrative; memories themselves, fragments of the same rhapsodic song. 
One of the most important digressions occurs a third of the way into the 
narrative and deserves to be quoted in its entirety: 
Reminiscences (Erinnerungen), even extensive ones, do not 
always amount to an autobiography. And these quite 
certainly do not, even for the Berlin years that I am 
exclusively concerned with here. For autobiography has to 
do with time, with sequence and what makes up the 
continuous flow of life. Here, I am talking of space, of 
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moments and discontinuities (Hier aber ist von einem 
Raum, von Augenblicken und vom Unstetigen die Rede). For 
even if months and years appear here, it is in the form they 
have at the moment of recollection. This strange form - it 
may be called fleeting or eternal (man mag sie fliichtig oder 
ewzg nennen) - is in neither case the stuff that life is made 
of. And this is shown not so much by the role that my own 
life plays here, as by that of the people closest to me in 
Berlin - whoever and whenever they may have been. The 
atmosphere of the city that is here evoked allots them only a 
brief, shadowy existence. They steal along its walls like 
beggars, appear wraithlike at windows, to vanish again, 
sniff at thresholds like a genius loci, and even if they fill 
whole quarters with their names, it is as a dead man's fills 
his gravestone. Noisy, matter-of-fact Berlin, the city of 
work and the metropolis of business, nevertheless has more, 
rather than less, than some others, of those places and 
moments when it bears witness to the dead, shows itself full 
of dead; and the obscure awareness of these moments, these 
places, perhaps more than anything else, confers on 
childhood memories a quality that makes them at once as 
evanescent and as alluringly tormenting as half-forgotten 
dreams.2 
The transparency of Benjamin's discourse on the temporal narratives of 
reminiscence and autobiography, and their dissimilarities, must be 
regarded with caution. The main difference between autobiography and 
the peculiar kind of reminiscence Benjamin writes in A Berlin Chronicle 
lies in the contrast between the temporal structure of the former and the 
spatial structure of the latter. Whereas autobiography is made of a 
"continuous flow of life" (den stetigen Fluj3 des Lebens), Benjamin's 
reminiscence comprises "moments and discontinuities". This is clearly true 
if an autobiography is narrated in a linear fashion consonant with the 
unfolding of life. In this case individual segments, the "moments" 
(Augenblicken) Benjamin speaks of, are linked chronologically to describe 
a clear beginning, middle and end. Such an autobiography is the sewing 
together of temporal individualities, whose orchestration is delegated to 
the sequential continuity of linear time. Each segment is understood and 
interpreted in the context of a community of segments whose very 
2 Benjamin, Walter, Rejlectzons, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), p. 28. 
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communality is decreed by a chronological hierarchy. Each part makes 
sense not so much by virtue of its being as such as by virtue of its 
belonging to a greater whole in which its essence is measured in relation to 
what follows or proceeds. 
In this kind of autobiography, an isolated "moment" is meaningless and 
pointless. What is important is the dependent relationship of the part and 
the whole, and while the part is necessary for the whole, it is also irrelevant 
without the whole. Autobiography, in the sense given to it by Benjamin, is 
a narrative that wishes to possess a temporal fragment by knowing it in the 
context of a community of temporal fragments. An individual fragment is 
not possessed in relation to the knowing of it as such, but to the knowing 
ofthe whole within which each fragment sacrifices its own specificity and 
unique meaning. Is this the price that must be paid to achieve the 
intelligibility of life and, more generally, the intelligibility of history? 
In A Berlin Chronicle Benjamin chooses the opposite path. He narrates 
segments in their individuality; he narrates moments as such by wresting 
them away from a temporal continuity and casting them into space. What 
one sees, therefore, is not the whole rolling in an uninterrupted narrative 
before the eyes, but rather snippets, glimpses of life crystallised in their 
spatial masks. In other words, what Benjamin tells is nothing other than 
remnants of time, postcards from the past whose incompleteness can only 
evoke or suggest their becoming, their coming forward in presence. In 
possessing these "discontinuities" we must also learn to renounce the 
whole, in the sense Martin Heidegger gives to the word "renunciation."3 
What I mean is that in saying the moments we renounce the whole by 
singing it into presence. This possession is also the knowledge of the halo, 
of that which exists in the "death mask" of its incompleteness. We can 
perhaps now understand better Benjamin's emphasis on the "now" and 
place Giorgio Agamben's important remark on Benjamin's temporality 
into context: 
Instead of the nullified present (il presente nulli.ficato) of 
the metaphysical tradition, Benjamin posits a 'present 
which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and 
has come to a stop (si tiene immobile sulla soglia del 
tempo)'. Instead of the social democratic and historicist 
notion of the historical progress of humankind, which 
3 Heidegger, Martin, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper, 1982), pp. 
139. 
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'cannot be sundered from the concept of its progression 
through a homogeneous empty time', he puts forward the 
revolutionaries' 'awareness that they are about to make the 
continuum of history explode'. Against the empty, 
quantified instant, he sets a 'time of the now' (un tempo-
ora), Jetzt-Zeit, construed as a messianic cessation of 
happening, which 'comprises the entire history of mankind 
. b .d t ' 4 m an enormous a n gemen . 
The "past of the now", as narrated in A Berlin Chronicle, has exactly the 
same function as the ''time of the now". In fact, Benjamin's critique of the 
"nullified present of the metaphysical tradition" is really the critique of a 
nullified time; a time robbed of its moments as independent entities. In this 
nullified time, moments are forced to roll into each other in the service of 
the whole; they ultimately vanish into the blur of a temporal crowd. The 
sacrifice of the moment is the celebration of the whole and its general 
(because assembled) truth as opposed to the truth of the specific. The long 
perspective of the whole, its historical length and longevity, is at the base 
of its power but it is also the cause of its profound limitations. 
If the whole - the history of Western thought, for instance - provides us 
with a sense of general grounding, it also betrays the inevitable 
vulnerability of this very grounding. This vulnerability lies precisely in the 
potential inaccessibility and unintelligibility of one or more of its 
originally constitutive parts, for instance the essence of ancient Greek 
thought. If it is true that the whole is produced by individual moments, and 
their subsequent sacrifice, it is also true that the whole may continue to be 
even when one of these moments and its original essence have become 
blurred, uncertain. Similarly our life "goes on", and autobiography can be 
written, even in the irreparable absence of some of the individual moments 
that made it. And yet, as Benjamin reminds us, " ... it is to cheat oneself of 
the richest prize to preserve as a record merely the inventory of one's 
d. ,s tscovery ... 
4 Agamben, G10rgio, Infancy and Hzstory The Destruction of Expenence, trans Liz Heron (London & 
New York· Verso, 1993), p. 102 
s Heidegger, Martin and Fink, Eugen, Heraclzllls Seminar, trans Charles H. Seibert (Evanston. 
Northwestern University Press, 1993), p. 102. 
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3. In Heraclitus Seminar, Heidegger, Fink and the participants were 
confronted by the opposite problem. They had fragments of Heraclitus' 
work but could not fit them into the context of the whole. How could they 
make sense of what they believed to be one of the key notions in 
Heraclitus's writing, ta panta ("the universe", "everything"), and its 
relation to being, en, if all they had to work on were only the remnants of a 
larger and irretrievably lost narrative? 
Participant: If we attempt to make clear to ourselves the 
meaning of ta panta starting from a fragment, can't we 
revert to Fr. 50 in which it is said, 'Everything is one?' 
Heidegger: But everything we have of Heraclitus' 
fragments is not the whole, is not the whole Heraclitus.6 
Heidegger's frustration and delight, his sharp and also quasi-exultant 
reply, is an interesting mixture of despondency and excitement in the face 
of a typical hermeneutical circularity. The participants' predicament is 
compounded by the fact that the whole of Western thought is rather 
tentative in its dealing with this moment of ancient Greek thought: "From 
Martin Heidegger's dialogues with the Greeks", writes Fink, "in many of 
his writings, we can learn how the furthest becomes near and the most 
familiar becomes strange, and how we remain restless and are unable to 
rely on a sure interpretation of the Greeks. For us, the Greeks signify an 
enormous challenge."7 Heraclitus Seminar is interesting and instructive, 
because it is a practical instance of present thought and present thinkers 
questioning the remains of the past in search of a wholeness that can only 
exist through and because of its parts. As such, Heraclitus Seminar and the 
methodological approach adopted for this journey of discovery, for this 
digging away, sheds light on and assist us in our endeavour to understand 
the difference between the meaning of autobiography and reminiscence in 
Benjamin's A Berlin Chronicle. 
A Berlin Chronicle is not an autobiography simply because it is not 
supported and subsumed by a given, present before us whole, whose main 
traits are carefully connected and explained temporal segments, generating 
union and harmony. What the Chronicle lacks is the orchestrating 
subjectivity - as historicity - of autobiographical writings. In its place 
Benjamin provides discontinuities and fragments. If Heraclitus' are 
6 Heidegger & Fink, Heraclitus Semmar, p 17. 
7 Heidegger & Fink, Heraclitus Seminar, p. 3. 
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fragments of thought, linguistic remains, Benjamin's fragments are visual 
memories, and if the transposition of Heraclitus' fragments into 
contemporary thought and language begins from a grasping of the 
"spiritual views" underpinning them, similarly Benjamin's translation of 
memories into language must commence from thinking temporal gaps and 
shadows. To make the affinities between the methodology applied in the 
Heraclitus Seminar and Benjamin's reminiscences in A Berlin Chronicle 
stand out once and for all, we need to look closely at the distinction that 
Fink makes between philology and "spiritual view" on the one hand, and, 
on the other, at Benjamin's distinction between mnemonic stuff and the 
"stuff that life is made of''. In Heraclitus Seminar Fink writes thus: 
Our seminar should be an exercise in thinking, that is, in 
reflection on the thoughts anticipated by Heraclitus. 
Confronted with his texts, left to us only as fragments, we 
are not so much concerned with the philological 
problematic, as important as it might be, as with advancing 
into the matter itself, that is, toward the matter that must 
have stood before Heraclitus's spiritual view. This matter is 
not simply on hand like a result or like some spoken 
tradition; rather, it can be opened up or blocked from view 
precisely through the spoken tradition. It is not correct to 
view the matter of philosophy, particularly the matter of 
thinking as Martin Heidegger has formulated it, as a 
product lying before us. The matter of thinking does not lie 
somewhere before us like a land of truth into which one can 
advance; it is not a thing that we can discover and uncover.8 
Let us recall now this passage in A Berlin Chronicle: "Here, I am talking of 
a space, of moments and discontinuities. For even if months and years 
appear here, it is in the form they have at the moment of recollection. This 
strange form - it may be called fleeting or eternal - is in neither case the 
stuff that life is made of." Benjamin's visual memories are a by-product of 
the present in which they are remembered and, most importantly, they are 
not individual parts of an assembled whole. They are not like life, which 
proceeds sequentially and then puts things together chronologically, 
following a linear progression. Rather, they are moments crystallised in 
their fleeting yet eternal memorability, a series of unchangeable, detailed 
"nows", Their precision, their exactness as such is matched by the 
8 He1degger & Fink, Heraclitus Semmar, p. 3 
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uncertain, fuzzy and also unavailable surroundings. They are "shadows", 
names on "gravestones", echoes of a larger existence that spills over as 
their very own halo. 
Perhaps the most appropriate metaphor for the fragments of a thinker 
long gone is that of sound. What perceptible truth remains can be thought 
of as a sound that once carried a precise meaning made up of space, time, 
landscapes, language - in a word, life .. And yet, what is left as a fragment 
is not life, but a sound the resounding of which is the form we give to it 
"now". How could philology, the life of language turned back upon itself, 
its rewound history, regain the totality of a whole life to us? It may perhaps 
bring forward other parts, other sounds, other shadows of the whole. The 
whole as such remains concealed, but in remaining so it "releases us", in 
the words of Fink, "to the matter that merits being named the matter of 
thinking."9 Similarly, the concealed past releases us to the matter that 
merits being named the matter of memory and relates it to the matter of 
life. 
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Creativity and Personality 
We know a surprising amount about the nature of individual creativity. 
During the twentieth century, the empirical cognitive psychology of 
creation established a comprehensive list of attributes of creative 
personalities.1 As a result, we can say with some confidence that creative 
individuals are a mirror of the nature of creation. Creation is best described 
as a union of opposites. This is its most enduring hallmark. Creative 
personalities are literal embodiments of this universal trait of creative 
action. They are often walking contradictions. They combine enthusiastic 
energies with the capacity for quiet concentration. They are predictive and 
insightful while displaying narve, even credulous, wonderment at things. 
They are playful but disciplined, imaginative but grounded, responsible and 
irresponsible in turns. They mix extroverted and introverted, sociable and 
anti-social traits. Creative individuals are often lacking in courtesies and 
social manners, yet have close long-term intellectual friends and peers to 
whom they relate on the most generous and intimate terms. 
About their own work, they are both humble and proud. They treat it 
with enthusiastic reverence and dispassionate, even brutal, objectivity. 
They are persons of wide interests and expansive curiosities yet they are 
persistent, even obsessive, about pursuing defined intellectual goals. 
Creative personalities are adventurous, even thrill-seeking, but for a point. 
At the highest level, "the point" is to bridge apparently unbridgeable 
divides. The ambition, say, to unify Einstein's theory of relativity with 
quantum mechanics is a classic case in point. Creative personalities are 
persistent in the face of the "it can't be done" response to the difficult, even 
recalcitrant, nature of creative problem-solving. Persistence, translated into 
social situations, can take the shape of stubbornness and uncooperativeness 
- and the working of long, anti-social hours. Persistence in creation 
requires mental discipline, concentration, and focus. The flipside of this 
1 This tradition is epitomised by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity Flow a11d the Psychology of 
D1scovery and Invention (New York: HarperCollins, 1996). 
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